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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETH S. LEWIS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
THOMAS G. PIKE, individually, 
THE LOCKHART COMPANY, a Utah 
Industrial Loan Corporation; 
and AMERICAN BANKERS LIFE 
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, 
a foreign corporation, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18195 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by pleintiff (appellant) 
against defendants (respondents) for damages incurred to 
plaintiff upon the death of her husband by defendants' 
negligent failure to process a loan application to include 
credit life insurance on the life of plaintiff's husband. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on 
December 3, 1981. The District Judge, Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
Judgment was entered on December 15, 1981. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this Court set aside the 
summary judgment entered in this matter and order the case 
to be tried on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June of 1979 Darrel Lewis, husband of appellant Beth 
S. Lewis, began having dizzy spells. He visited Dr. Hurbert 
Burton in Bountiful and was hospitalized for about four days 
because of heart-related and blood pressure problems. 
Deposition digest of Beth S. Lewis, (hereinafter "Lewis 
deposition") pp 15-22. 
Near the end of June, 1979 respondent Thomas G. Pike, 
an employee of The Lockhart Company, contacted Mr. Lewis 
(since deceased) by telephone with respect to a mortgage 
contract on the Lewis home which The Lockhart Company had 
just purchased. During the course of the conversation a 
debt consolidation loan was discussed. Deposition digest of 
Thomas G. Pike (hereinafter "Pike deposition") pp 5-6. Mr. 
Pike mailed a loan application to the Lewis'. Exhibit "l" 
to Lewis deposition. Mr. and Mrs. Lewis discussed the loan 
application and appellant, concerned over her husband's 
heart problems, stated to her husband that she woul o not 
mortgage her home "without an insurance policy on it." 
Lewis deposition, pp 30-31. The proposed loan was for the 
purpose of paying off all of the Lewis' outstanding debts. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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On or about July 2, 1979 appellant and her husband 
visited resp0ndent Lockhart Company for the purpose of 
obtaining a loan in the approximate amount of $18, 000. 00. 
While meeting with respondent Thomas G. Pike ~t The LockhPrt 
Company, P_ppellant and her husband were shown a loan 
disclosure statement. This disclosure statement is attached 
to the Lewis deposition as Exhibit "5" and to the Pike 
deposition as Exhibit "l." 
Lewis' at the closing that 
Mr. Pike explained to the 
the applied-for loan did not 
include in the repayment figures the premium for credit life 
insurance. Appellant informed Mr. Pike and her husband that 
she would not consent to the issuance of any loan which did 
not include credit life insurance on the life of her 
husband. Lewis Affidavit, ,f's 4 & 5; Lewis deposition, 
p 39. Appellant specifically informed Mr. Pike that no 
lien, mortgage or trust deed would be signed giving The 
Lockhart Company an interest in the Lewis home unless credit 
life insurance was taken out on the life of Darrel Lewis. 
The only discussion thereafter had between appellant, Mr. 
Lewis and Mr. Pike concerned figures for including j oin.t 
credit life insurance on both Mr. Lewis and appellant. 
Lewis Affidavit, ,6. 
At the time of the loan closing, Mr. Pike drew Mr. and 
Mrs. Lewis' attention to that part of the disclosure 
statement dealing with insurance. Lewis Affidavit, ,7. The 
insurance portion of the disclosure statement contains 
various sub-parts in which the borrowers arP to indicate 
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whether they ded_~e disability insurance, single or joint 
credit life insurance, or whether they do not want credit 
life or disability insurance. After the borrower indicates 
his choice(s) on the disclosure statement, he is to sign and 
date the insurance portion of the statement. Mr. Pike 
indicated that the section of the disclosure statement 
relating to insurance "would be left open for determination 
of whether the credit life would be on Mr. Lewis only or on 
your life [Mrs. Lewis] and Mr. Lewis jointly." T_.ewis 
Affidavit, ,[7; see also Lewis deposition, P 39. The loan 
was closed with an understanding on appellant's part that, 
based on appellant's verbal refusal to consent to the trust 
deed lien on her home without credit life insurance on her 
husband, the only matter left for further arrangement would 
be whether or not insurance would be on joint lives or on 
her husband's life only. Lewis Affidavit, ~r 8. At no time 
did appellant ever authorize Mr. Pike to issue the loan or 
loan proceeds without, at a minimum, credit life insurance 
on her husband, and appellant was informed that the 
insurance could be issued at any time after the loan was 
closed. Lewis Affidavit, ,9. The loan proceeds were 
disbursed 
deposition, 
Mr. Lewis 
ten days after the 
pp 40-41 and Exhibit 
attempted to contact 
loan closing. Lewis 
"5." After the closing, 
Mr. Pike 0n different 
occasions in order to obtain additional information about 
credit life insurance. Lewis Affidavit, ,9. Although the 
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record cann?t reflect every attempt hy the late Mr. Lewis to 
cont2ct Mr. Pike, several attempts have been verified. 
On August 5th or 7th, 1979 when Mr. Lewis went 
personally to The Lockhart Company to make the first payment 
due on the loan, he attempted to contact Mr. Pike, but being 
unsuccessful, left a note for Mr. Pike which related to 
insurance. Pike deposition, p 29; Lewis deposition, pp 
42-43. Mr. Lewis reported to appellant that he had gone to 
The Lockhart Company and had taken care of everything and 
that Mr. Pike was not available. Lewis deposition, p 42. 
Mr. Lewis tried to reach Mr. Pike by telephone around the 
middle of August, 1979. Lewis deposition, pp 44-45. Mr. 
Lewis made a second personal visit to The Lockhart Company 
sometime before the end of August, 1979 to discuss insurance 
with Mr. Pike, and failing to find Mr. Pike in left a second 
note for him. This note is attached to the Lewis deposition 
as Exhibit "6" and the Pike deposition as Exhibit "2" and 
reads as follows: 
Dear Mr. Pike, 
I left a note for you to give me the 
info the ammmt life ins would cost 
per m:mth. I did not hear from you. 
Could you please give me this info. 
Thank you. 
D. E. Lewis 
Mr. Pike's secretary sent Mr. Lewis the following 
letter (which was found by appellant in her husband's desk 
after his death): 
Mr. Lewis, 
Tom Pike has gone on vacation and 
won't be back till Tuesday, Aug 28. 
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So when he gets here I' 11 give him 
the note and tell him what you said. 
J.M. 
Mr. Lewis died of a heart attack on September 17, 1979. 
Lewis deposition, p 41. Appellant called The Lockhart 
Company near the end of September, 1979 asking how to handle 
the loan with mortgage insurance and she was informed there 
was no credit life insurance on her husband. Lewis 
deposition, pp 46-47. Within a da.y or two after the 
telephone call, appellant visited Mr. Pike at The Lockhart 
Company and was informed by Mr. Pike that he had received 
the above-quoted note from Mr. Lewis, but that he had in 
fact never gotten back in touch with him about it prior to 
Mr. Lewis' death. Lewis deposition, pp 47-49; Lewis 
Affidavit, ,f 10. At that time Mr. Pike gave appellant a copy 
of the second note of which appellant was unaware. Lewis 
deposition, p 48. 
Appellant paid off the referred-to loan around the 
middle of November, 1979 with life insurcmce proceeds she 
had received from an insurance policy provided by her 
husband's employer. Lewis deposition, p 51. Shortly 
thereafter, appellant sought legal counsel and filed the 
complaint in this case wherein it is alleged that 
respondents were negligent in failing to, among other 
things, (1) obtain the necessary and requested insurance, 
(2) provide Darrel Lewis with all information relative to 
the obtaining of the insurance, and (3) timely process the 
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loan application and insurance application so as to reflect 
the existence of credit life insurance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED H1 CR.ANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE EXISTS GENUINE 
ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS WITH 
RESPECT TO "WHETHER DEFEl\TDAl'TTS' FAILURE 
TO PROVIDE INSURANCE OR FOLLOW-UP ON 
REQUESTS FOR OR INQUIRIES RELATING TC 
INSURANCE CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS 
TO APPELLANT. 
The proper standard to be followed in reviewing a lower 
court's grant of summary judgment was enunciated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Bullock v. DPserPt Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960): 
A surrrna.ry judgment must be supported by evidence, 
admissions and inferences which when viewed in the 
light IIDst favorable to the loser shows that, "there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the roving party should be entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.'' Such showing must preclude all 
reasonable possibility that the loser could, if 
given a trial, produce evidence which would 
reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. 
Viewing the evidence, admissions and inferences 
contained i_n the record below in the light most favorable to 
appelL?.nt, it is clear that there et_re genuine issues of 
material fact with respect to whether defendants were 
negligent in the handling of the Lewis' requests or 
inquiries relating to credit life insurance. 
Appellant states in her Affidavit that she "informed 
both Mr. Pike and her husb2.nd" during the loan closing that 
she "would not consent to the issuance of any loan which did 
7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not include credit life insurance" on her husband's life. 
Lewis Affidavit, ,5. Mr. Pike, however, denied that such a 
statement was made and stated that there "was a decision not 
to have insurance" at the time of the loan closing. Pike 
deposition, pp 20, 27 and 28. Accepting appellant's 
Affidavit as true, which the court must do under the Bullock 
standard, an issue of fact is created as to whether 
defendants were negligent in not seeing that appellant's 
insurance demands were finalized prior to the issuance of 
the loa.n proceeds. 
The insurance section of the disclosure statement 
(Lewis deposition, Exhibit "5," Pike deposition, Exhibit 
"l") referred to in the above statement of facts and the 
discussions relating thereto raise further issues of fact as 
will be shown. It is important to note that the sub-parts 
of the insurance section of the loan disclosure statement 
relating to disability and credit life insurance which are 
to be filled out and signed by the borrower, if the borrower 
desires insurance, are in regular type face, while the 
sub-part relating to the election not to have insurance 
which is to be filled out and signed, if such an election is 
made, has bold face type and reads as follows: "I DO NOT 
want credit life or disabiJj_ty insurance." The logical 
inference which follows is that The Lockhart Company felt it 
essential that this sub-part be filled out and signed by all 
those who do not desire insurance in order that no question 
of fact be raised later on. As noted by the disclosure 
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statement, the entire section relating to insurance is 
blank. Mr. Pike stated at page 20 of his rleposition that 
the Lewis' had made a decision prior to the time of the loan 
closing not to have insurance "and that is why the 
disclosure was filled out the way it was." When asked why 
the part of the disclosure statement where the borrower 
elects not to have credit life insurance wa.s not filled out 
and signed, he stated: "I'm just not totally sure in this 
case. This is done at the time of closing when we are 
together." Pike deposition, p 20. Mr. Pike admitted that 
he was the only employee of The Lockhart Company present at 
the closing and then when asked if it was The Lockhart 
Company's normal procedure where credit life insurance is 
refused to require the section of the form which states "I 
DO NOT want credit life or disability insurance" to be 
filled out and to have the borrowers sign and date that 
section, he stated: "Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't." 
Pike deposition, p 21. Mr. Pike's elusive answer, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant, means, 
for purposes of this appeal, that it was indeed company 
policy on this occasion to fill out this section of the 
statement. This was not done. The failure to do so 
corroborates appellant's version of the facts that the 
reason the insurance section was left blank was because, 
while she was firm on her decision not to take out the loan 
without credit life insurance on her husband, the Lewis' 
were undecided as to whether credit life insurance should be 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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purchased for Mrs. Lewis also. Appellant states the 
insurance section of the disclosure statement was to be 
filled in when she or her husband got back in touch with Mr. 
Pike and informed him of their decision with respect to 
whether they wanted joint insurance. Lewis deposition, p 
39; Lewis Affidavit, ,[' s 3-7. 
Mr. Lewis did make various attempts to contact Mr. Pike 
with respect to the loan insurance as pointed out in the 
abov~ statement of facts. It is appellant's contention that 
Mr. Pike's failure to follow-up on the requests and 
inquiries constitutes negligence on his part and actionable 
by her because she was jointly and severally liable with her 
husband on the loan. For example, after Mr. Lewis 
personally dropped off the first note regarding insurance to 
Mr. Pike, the only evidence that Mr. Pike made any attempt 
to follow-up on the note is his self-serving statement that 
he tried to call Mr. Lewis at home "a time or two" during 
the next two weeks. Mr. Pike admitted that he did not 
contact anyone by his attempted calls and that he did not 
send a letter regarding the matter even though he was aware 
that he was leaving for a vacation. He left for a vacation, 
leaving the matter completely unattended. Pike deposition, 
pp 29-32. 
The issue of fact as to whether defendants were 
neglieent is further highlighted by a statement Mr. Pike 
made to appellant after the death of her husband. Although 
1 
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Mr. Pike h~rl returned from vacation on or before August 28, 
1979, he admitted to appellant that he "had not gotten back" 
with appellant's husband before her husband's death, even 
though Mr. Pike, on return from his vacation, had received a 
second note regarding insurance which Mr. Lewis had 
personally dropped off at The Lockhart Company. Pike 
deposition, pp 30-32 and 49. Mr. Pike had three weeks after 
his vacation in which to contact Mr. Lewis regarding this 
note before Mr. Lewis died of a sudden heart attack on 
September 17, 1979. Pike deposition, pp 30-32. 
Clearly the above discussion indicates that there are 
issues of material fact with respect to whether defendant 
was negligent which need to be resolved by a jury. Mrs. 
Lewis should have her chance to prove negligence. 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING 
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER 
ASSERTED IN HEARSAY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN 
APPELLANT'S DECEASED HUSBAND AND THE 
DEFENDANTS IN DETERMINING THAT THE DECEASED 
HAD ELECTED TO FORGO CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE 
OR WAS UNDECIDED ABOUT SAID INSURANCE. 
In reaching a conclusion with respect to defendants' 
1fotion for Summary Judgment, Judge Taylor read the complete 
text of the second note which had been left for Mr. Pike by 
the now deceased Mr. Lewis. That note reads as follows: 
Dear Mr. Pike, 
I left a note for you to give rne the info 
the anmmt of life ins would cost per rronth. 
I did not hear from you. Could you please 
give TIE this info. 
Thank you, 
D. E. Lewis 
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After reading the above note, Judge Taylor stated in his 
oral ruling from the bench that, as nearly as counsel can 
retP..ember, "it is clear fron this document that Mr. Lewis, 
prior to his death, had not decided one way or another about 
insurance but was only requesting information as to its 
monthly cost; therefore, summary judgment is proper." The 
lower court made two fundamental errors in its ruling. 
First, the note was hearsay and the court used it to prove 
the truth of the matters asserted therein, i.e., that 
decedent was merely requesting information as to the cost of 
the insurance. While this note may be properly considered 
by the court or by a jury in other contexts such as to show 
tha.t Mr. Pike was on notice that Mr. Lewis was inquiring 
about insurance and wanted a re~ponse, the court's 
additional use to ascertain the author's intent was not 
permissible. Second, even if the decedent was only 
inquiring about insurance and had not yet made up his mind, 
that fact or conclusion is immaterial and could not serve as 
a basis for summary judgment against his widow. Plaintiff's 
complaint sounds in tort (not contract) and the issues 
raised by the complaint include the issue of whether 
defendants were negligent in failing to follow up on the 
decedent's insurance requests or inquiries in light of 
appellant's unrebutted statement to Mr. Pike that she would 
not consent to the issuance of any loan which did not 
include life insurance on her husband. Lewis Affidavit, 
''s 4 and 5; Lewis deposition, p 39. The court considered 
1 
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the note a~ if Mrs. Lewis had brought a breach of contract 
action on behalf of her deceased husbcnd's estate or somehow 
determined that Mr. Lewis' evidenced subjective intent was 
imputed to his wife, a joint obliger on the loan, to bar her 
separate negligence claim against the loan officer and other 
defend.ants. Clearly the court erred in considering the 
hearsay statements or inferences in the note with respect to 
appellant's action for negligence. 
POU!T III: ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT'S 
DECEASED HUSBAND ELECTED NOT TO OBTAIN 
CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE, THE DISTRICT 
COURT ERRED IN ASSERTING SAID ELECTION 
AGAINST APPELLANT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The effect of the court's ruling is that appellant has 
no cause of action because of the court's finding and 
interpretation of the subjective intent of Mr. Lewis that he 
had elected not to obtain credit life insurance since, as 
the court concluded, he was still undecided about the issue 
of insurance at the time he wrote the note. Assuming, 
arguendo, that Mr. Lewis had not decided to obtain insurance 
or was still undecided, the court's assertion of this 
election or indecision against appellant cis a matter of law, 
resulting in a dismissal of her clai.m that the defendants 
were negligent in handling her part of the loan application 
procedure, was clecrly improper. 
Under Utah law husbands are not automatically the 
agents for their wives. In Capital Electric Co. v. 
Campbell, 217 P. 2d 392, 394 (Utah 1950), in an action to 
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foreclose a mechanic's lien, the Utah court held that "some 
fact or circumstance is required in addition to the mar2..tal 
relation and management of the wife's property by the 
husband before an agency of the husband will be inferred." 
The facts and circumstances in the case at bar further 
negate the possibility of an agency relationship between Mr. 
and Mrs. Lewis as Mrs. Lewis specifically stated to her 
husband and Mr. Pike that "she would not consent to the 
issuance of any loan which did not include credit life 
insurance on the life of her husband." Lewis affidavit, ~5. 
Appellant's deceased husband's alleged subjective intent 
with respect to the above-referenced note is immaterial and 
non-assertable against appellant as evidence of contributory 
negligence on the part of appellant or lack of a duty on the 
part of defendants. 
Based on the 
rules of law, the 
Court set aside the 
order the case to be 
CONCLUSION 
facts of this case and the applicable 
appellant reauests that this Honorable 
summary judgment of the lower court and 
tried on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
pc.)~ 
Harold A. Hintze 
FOX, EDWARDS & ~ARDINER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed two 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Gifford W. 
Price of Greene, Callister & Nebeker, Attorneys for 
Respondents, 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84133, by placing said copies in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, this Jsf'-day of March, 1982. 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
By ~~v4Jl_ 
cretary 
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